

Accommodation Cordially DESIRED,
AND
REALLY INTENDED.
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
TENDING,
To the satisfaction of all such, who do either *Wilfully*,
or *Ignorantly* Conceive that the P A R L I A M E N T
is Disaffected to P E A C E.

W R I T T E N

Upon occasion of a late Pamphlet, pretended to be Printed at
Oxford; entituled a R E P L Y to the Answer of the L O N D O N -
P E T I T I O N for P E A C E.



L O N D O N, 1642.



ACCOMMODATION *Cordially* DESIRED,

A N D

REALLY INTENDED.

A Moderate *Discourse*, tending to the satisfaction of all
such who, &c.



Petition for Peace is presented to the Parliament by some thousands of Citizens ; the Petition findes a peaceable answer ; and that Answer (as I shall now set forth) is opposed by an unpeaceable Reply, but that time may be the better husbanded , and indifferent Readers the better satisfied , before I undertake the Replication it selfe, I desire all men to be preadvertis-

sed of some few things.

Schollars have been very active in this unnaturall warre, both in rayfing and fomenting it ; the tongue hath made some wounds as well as the hand ; and the sword had never bin so keene , had it not been whetted by the Pen : but Schollars are not active on both sides alike (to shew their partiality, & interest in this cause) 'tis only on the Kings side , where the Pen and the Launce are both brandisht in the same hand. And it is wisely ordered, for the Kings interest wil be the more hopefully pursu'd when Schollars second it with their Arts, and the Schollars Interests will be the easier gained, when the King seconds them with his Armes. But of all kindes of Learning Oratory is most relyed on : and of a'l kinds of Oratory, that is most made use of, which is most wantonly painted and dressed ; and borrowes most from ostentatious Art, and is therefore most unfit for businesse either of Law or State, because it is most fit to inveagle, and deceive with its false graces and flourishes. The tongue of *Cyneas* was very advantageous to *Pyrrhus* in subduing Townes and Cities, but 'tis likely more of manly Logick then of ef-

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feminate

feminate Rhetorick flow'd from that tongue of his, or else Townes and Cities in those dayes were governed by very illiterate men. None but the duller sort of people are to be catcht by pure *oratory*, the wiser sort are well enough instructed, that when the Fowlers pipe playes most melodiously, the snare is coucht most perniciously. That man is very unworthy to judge of Papers that cannot distinguish between foundations and superstructions, reasons and Assumptions: that cannot discern between proving of premisses and pursuing of conclusions: and yet the chiefest fraud of the Orator is to passe over that part of the businesse which requires most prooffe, without prooffe at all, & that which is most darke without light at all, and that which is most important without mention at all. 'Tis enough for the Orator to blazon the bloody shield of war in general, when 'tis his sole charge to dispute who are the guilty causes & promoters of this particular War: 'Tis enough for him to take it for granted, or at most upon his own credit to affirme it, *That the Kings party of Papists and Arminian Clergy men and delinquents were first assayled by this Parliament, without cause or danger; and so presaltum to proceed to vëcious invectives, & cursed censures against the Parliament: when his main task is to proove either that a Parliament may in no case whatsoever defend it selfe, or that this warre in the Parliament is not defensive.* If wee peruse all the papers which have come out in the Kings behalfe, under his name, or otherwise; we shall find nothing proper to be insilted on but these two points, *That defensive warre is unlawfull in Parliaments, or that this warre in the Parliament is not defensive;* and yet nothing lesse hath been insilted on; nay though the Fabricke bee vast that is built and raised thereupon, yet that which ought to support all the fabrick is utterly neglected; so in this reply (now to be examined) if much be affirmed, yet little is prooved, and if any prooffe be made 'tis of sequels, not of premisses; 'tis of assumptions deduced, not of *Theses* deducing: and 'tis plaine and obvious to all that the *Replicant* here pleads not as if he stood at the barre, but pronounces sentence, as if he sate on the Bench: We may justly therefore suspect that he aymes not at the satisfying of wise men, but the dazelling of simple men, and that he would not daube with his fucusses every line, & embellish with his Caressing Phrases every sentence, if he did not affect the pompe of Mr *Rhombus* the Pedant, rather then the gravitie of a Statist. The next Art of our *Replicant* is to impose those his nude averments which are most false and improbable, with most boldnesse and assurance, assailing as it were thereby the heliefe of other men with armed violence. That it may passe for currant that *Franham Castle was surprized contrary to the faith, and Treaty of Sir William Waller* (with whom no Treaty was ever entertained nor spoken of,) it must be further averred, *That our side was false at Winchester, false in York shire, false every where; but these things*

eadem

eadem facilitate negantur, quâ affirmantur. Another advantage of the Kings party is by multitude of writings, invective and Satyricall: both the Universities are become mints of defamatory disgracefull papers, the Regiments of the Kings Pen-and-Inkhorne men, are more and fuller then of his sword-men; and though too many papers are scattered of both sides, yet those of the Kings are most of them serious, and done by able men, whereas those of the Parliaments side for the most part are ridiculous done by Sots, or prevaricators to the disadvantage of the partie. After these premeditations I come to the Replication it selfe. The substance of the Petition was *That the Parliament would tender such Propositions for Accommodation; as might be accepted with honour to his Majesty, and safety to the Kingdome.* The substance of the Answer was that the Parliament was truly and heartily desirous of a safe and honourable Accommodation, and for an instance of that their desire would seeke nothing from the King, but to enjoy the due essentiall Priviledges of his highest Court of Law and policie, which priviledge must needs qualifie and fitt them rather to judge, then to be judged by any other inferiour partie. That a totall submission to the King, he being so farre addicted to a faction of *Papists* and haters of *Parliaments*, could neither be safe nor honourable. That to submit to the Kings party were to submit to the foes of Religion and Libertie: foes irreconcilable, and such as ever had been dangerous, and were now made more furious by bloud against the Parliament. That if the Petitioners being but a part of *London*, and that but a part of *England*, should in stead of an honourable safe Accommodation presse the Parliament to a dishonourable unsafe submission to the Kings party, it were a breach of publike trust in the Parliament to yeeld therein, the Parliament being trusted by the whole Kingdome, that if a just fit Accommodation be intended the King ought to trust the Parliament in part, as well as the Parliament ought in part to trust the King. That both parties being equally disarmed, the Protestants being lesse countenanced by the King, and more obliged in Conscience by oathes and agreements, would be more obnoxious to disadvantages, then that party wherein so many *Papists* are predominant. That though the Parliament might submit, yet a faire Accommodation it could not obtaine, except the King would equally condescend thereunto. That if the Petitioners had found out a more safe and honourable Accommodation then the Parliament had yet discovered; (for that was possible) the Parliament would embrace it; That if none such could be found out, the affections and judgements of the Parliament ought not to be censur'd or distrusted. That it behooved the Petitioners to address themselves by the like petition to the King, if no want of affection to peace were apparent in the *Parliament*, as certainly none was.

In contradiction and opposition to all the severall poynts in this Analysis,

what the *Replican* hath set forth, wee shall now see in the same order.

1. The *great contrivers of our sad divisions, which abuse the weak reason of the people, to keepe up an unfortunate misunderstanding between King and Subject* are not named by the *Replican*; but they are clearly pointed out to be the *Chiefe Lords and Commons in Parliament*: for he saith, *Every new Vote of late hath been a new affluen*: and he makes *Pennington and the Citty Lecturers* to be but *Journey-men Rebels* under them: and even this Hellish slander he venteth under the name of the *Petitioners, whom he stiles the most considerable persons of the Citty*: and at the same time affirmeth, *that the people generally are of honest affections. And the Answer to the Petition in which, the words (he saies) are softer then oyle, though the matter of it be poison of Aspes, he attributes only to some Chiefe Engineers of mischief in the House, though it carry in it the Authority of the whole House.* Here is a wonder beyond all wonders. A few factious persons in Parliament over-awe the major, better and wiser part in Parliament; and by a few factious Instruments in Citty and Countrey abuse the major, better and wiser part there also into the most miserable distempers and calamities that ever were; and though the honest generality begin to grow wiser and are instructed by the sence of their miseries, and by other advertisements from loyall Papists and Prelates, and other pious Courtiers and souldiers to shake off their few Tormentors: Nay, and though the King himself has not onely published the most eloquent and subill Declarations to disabuse the people, that ever were (himselſe being the most beloved and honoured Prince that ever was for his indulgence to Liberty and Religion) but hath also advanced a most puissant and victorious Army to relieve these undeceived wretches; yet the incantation holds, no humane force either of Armes or Arts can dissolve it. The miracles of *Moses* had an impression of divine vertue upon them, and did therefore triumph over all the Egyptians spels: but in this case, *Mr Pym*, with I know not what infernall engines distorts and wrests all the Orbes of a Kingdome from their naturall motions; and yet no divine Art can resist him. 'Twas never beleev'd before that any but God could work contrary to nature, but now it must be beleev'd. But is it so apparent that the Parliament is averse from peace? yet saies the *Replican*, *For withdraw the fuel, and the fire is soon extinguish*: *Let the Parliament not foment the ill humour (by supplies of men, Armes and Ammunition) and the wound will beale of it selfe.* In the petition, nothing but an Accommodation, safe and honourable was pretended, but now we see a meere submission is intended in this replication.

'Tis not prooved: That the Armes of the Parliament are unjust; 'tis not prooved, that it may be safe for the Kingdome to prostrate, and subject Parliaments to the discretion of that faction which now has bereav'd us of the Kings presence and favour, yet because the *Replican* will take upon him to condemn Parliaments; we must also allow of his Judgement. But

But 'tis further say'd by the Replicant, *that even Accommodation it selfe is not pleasing in Parliament, witness the speech of one, I like not daubing;* and that of another, *I hate the name of Accommodation.* Hee which hates the name of an Accommodation as it has been used of late to signifie a totall submission, may love a true Accommodation in it selfe: and he that likes not the daubing of those which under the colour of Accommodation ayme at nothing but division and dissention amongst the people, may more heartily affect a safe, and honourable agreement, then the Replicant himselfe.

Can the Parliament expresse zeale to peace better then by contracting all its rights and priviledges into one compendious proposition, for the settling of union? To purchase true peace, the Parliament desires nothing but to retain the meere being of a Parliament; that is, to be the supreme Court of King and Kingdome. And if it can stand with the essence of such a Court to be arraign'd, tryed and sentenced by a faction of Papiists, Prelates, Delinquents, and Souldiers, the Parliament will submit to that Condition also.

2. When we expresse our feares of the Kings party, and therefore deny submission thereunto as dangerous and dishonourable, the Replicant tels us further, *we are required not to submit to our fellow subiects, but to the King only:* and he tels us further, *that the Lawes are the best security, and those we shall enjoy, and to claime any higher securitie is to assume the power of Kings.* How faire the Lawes of the Land have been sufficient to preserve to Parliaments, and the better part of loyall Protestant subjects their rightfull portion and interest in the Kings favour, for these 17. yeares last past, is knowne to all; The Lawes of Scotland could not secure the better and greater part there; The Lawes of Ireland have not saved the Brittaines and Protestants from Massacres there: and yet certainly both those Kingdomes are intituled to Lawes of as ample benefit, and vigour as ours now is. But what speake we of Common Lawes, when even at this instant such a free subjects house is burnt and plundered by the Kings party, in derision and despite of the Kings owne Proclamation and paticular *Placard* granted for the safeguard of himselfe and his family? As our Judges preyed upon us heretofore in matters of State, and Divines oppressed us in matters of Religion: so our Martialists now have a power of spoyling above the generall Law, or any particular protection. If the King thinke fit to grant safety to such a person, or such a Towne, it must be provided alwayes that such a Dutch or Scotch Commander, who conceives himselfe more skilfull in war then the King give his approbation withall; for my part I conceive it more honourable for the King to say that he cannot, then that he would not save his people from all those cursed indignities and cruelties which have been multiplyed upon us during this waite, and before by his adherents. As for Lawes therefore we must take notice that they may be employed either to the benefit or prejudice

dice of any Nation, and that they themselfs do require to be regulated by further Lawes. No Nation can be free without a three-fold priviledge: The first is in the framing and passing of Lawes. The second is in declaring and interpreting Lawes. And the third is in executing and preserving Lawes in force. Where the King is sole Law-maker all things are subject to his meer discretion, and a greater bondage then this never was nor can be; the *English* lie not under such base servitude, their King claimes but a part in the Legislative power: and yet neverthelesse of late by discontinuing of Writs for the summoning of Parliaments, and by the right of a Negative voyce in Parliaments, and an untimely dissolving of Parliaments, the peoples interest in this Legislative power has been much abridged and suspended. In the like manner also if the sole power of declaring Lawes were so in the King as that he might himselfe give Judgement, or create Judges at his pleasure without imposing Oathes of trust on them in behalfe of the people, or should deny redresses upon Appeales from them, our Legislative power would be vaine and uneffectuall to us. For my part I hold it an equall thing, whether just men make Lawes and unjust interpret them, or unjust men make Lawes and just interpret them. When it was just in the King of late to impose what taxes hee pleased, and as often as he pleased upon us for the preparing of *Armadoes* all over *England*. Our Nation was fallen into a most desperate thralldome, yet the fault was not then in the Lawes, but in the Judges, and such as had a power over the Judges, Lawes as they are deafe, and by a strict inflexibility more righteous then living Judges, so they are dumb also, and by their want of Language more imperfect then the best of men. And indeed since the Lawes of God and Nature, though knowne to all, yet do not utter to all the same sense, but remaine in many plaine points strangely controverted, as to their intent and meaning; how can we hope that any humane Lawes should satisfie all mens understanding in abstruse points, without some living Key to open them? the vast Pandects and digests of the Law sufficiently testifie, that in the clearest Law, which mankind could ever yet discover there are dark and endlesse Labyrinths, wherein the weaker sort of lay men are presently lost, & the learnedst advocates are tediously perplexed.

In the last place also if the sole power of enforcing and executing Lawes were so vested in the King, as that he might use it to the cessation or perversion of all justice, and the people were in such case remediesse, the interest in making and declaring of Law were invalid, and frustrate in the people, and the King might still enslave or destroy them at his pleasure. The *Replicant* sayes, *That under a Monarchy much must be trusted to the King, or else it will be debased into Democracie*. Tis confessed much must, but all must not be trusted: the question then is, how farre this *much* extends in a Monarchy of such a mixt nature as ours is, in such times as ours now are?

In absolute Monarchies all is trusted to the King: in absolute Democracies all is vested in the people: in a mixt Monarchy more is trusted to the King, then is reserved to the people; and in a mixt Democracie more is reserved to the people, then is derived to the Prince. In all formes of Government the people passes by way of trust, all that power which it retains not, and the difference of formes is only in degree, and the degrees are almost as various as the severall states of the world are, nay the same state admits of often changes many times, sometimes the people gaires, and sometimes looses, sometimes to its prejudice, sometimes not; and sometimes injuriously, sometimes not; but the degrees of ordinary power consist in the making, declaring and enforcing Law, except when forraigne warre is, and then it is expedient that a greater and more extraordinary trust be reposed in one, and this we see in *Holland*, the most exact Republicke, and in *England* the most exact Monarchy in the world. But it is a leud conceit of our Royalists now adayes to attribute to our King an absolute power over the *Militia* of this Land at all times alike, not distinguishing between Civill warres, wherein he may be a party and suspected; and between a forraigne warre, where he is neither a party nor suspected: for if our Kings will plead such a trust to our disadvantage, 'tis just that they produce some prooffe for it, and relye not upon meere Common use, 'tis true in case of Forraigne invasjon, 'tis expedient that the King be farre trusted, and yet even so, if the King should conspire with forraigne forces, or neglect to protect us against them, contrary to the intent of his trust, we might resume the common native *Pesse*, or *Militia* of the Land, for our owne defence without his consent. And much more reasonable is it in time of Peace, or Civill warre, if the King will deny his influences, or withdraw his presence, to obstruct Law, or will by his Negative voyce, or by force seeke to disable his highest Courts and Councils, and reduce all to arbitrary government: more reasonable is it, that the people secure to themselves the Law, their chiefest portion and best patrimony. For as the King cannot by Law deny to the people their undoubted interest in passing of Lawes; so neither can he defeat the same interest, or destroy the benefit thereof by misinterpretations, or by mis-executions of the same Lawes. No Nation can enjoy any freedom but by the right and share which it has in the Lawes, and if that right and share doe not extend to the preservation of Lawes in their true vigour and meaning, as well as to the Creation of them, 'tis emptie and defeasible at the Kings meere pleasure; *Much is to be trusted to the King*: true, but all is not (we see) trusted, some power we see is of Necessity to be reserved in free Nations, such as the King allowes us to be, and there is a difference also in the word *Trust*: for there is an arbitrary, and there is a necessary *Trust*, and the one may be resumed; the other not upon meere pleasure. Without all question, the wiser and juster

Princes

Princes are esteemed, the more the people ever trust them, but this makes no difference in the Legall and fundamentall *Trust* of the Kingdome, nor can infirme credulous, and easie Princes pretend alwayes to the same degree of power as their Ancestors have held, unlesse they can prescribe to their vertues also. Queene *Elizabeth* might with safety and expedience be trusted further then King *James*, even in those things where the Law did not trust her: but this is the misery of subjects, a l goes from them, but nothing must returne: The Court of a Prince is like the Lions den in the Fable, all the beasts leave prints and steps *advorsum* but none *retrosum*. But the *Replicant* further assures us, *That tis very easie to assigne the bounds of these severall trusts: for the Lawes and Customes of the Land determine both: nor will his Maiestie* (he saies) *require any new trust to himselfe, or deny any old trust to us.* Our great Divines were to bee admired for their profound knowledge in the mysteries of Law were they not Courtiers: but now the King is presum'd to comprehend *omnia jura in scrinio Pectoris*: and so they by their residence at Court discerne all the secrets of Law and State *in speculo Imperii*, just as our heavenly Saints doe read all things else *in speculo Trinitatis*. Our gravest Sages of the Law are much divided in points of lesse moment and intricacie, and as for the precise metes and bounds, where Sovereignty and Liberty are sever'd, and the direct degrees of publike trust in all cases, and at all times, they looke upon them as grand difficulties, scarce fit to be debated but in the sacred Court of Parliament; and yet Clergie-men think them but the first rudiments of all knowledge, obvious to very A.B.C.-*Darians*. They alwayes boast of the knowne Lawes of the Kingdome, in all disputes they referre us to the knowne Lawes and Customes of the Land, as if Judges were things utterly need esse, and the study of Law meerely superfluous. The Treshault Court of Parliament, of whose determination our learnedst Judges will not thinke dishonourably, cannot pierce into these known obvious Lawes, and yet every Sophister can: the Fountaines of Justice are now exhausted, and yet the Cisternes remaine full. But saies the *Replicant*, *If you seeke further security then the knowne Lawes, the people will see, that under the name of free subjects, you take upon you the power of Kings.* Sir, we desire to have our Lawes themselves secured to us, which you may turne like our owne Canons against our selves, if righteous and prudent Judges be not granted us, and all over-awing violence so prevented, as that the fruit of their Iudgements be clearely and intirely conveyed to us. And such securance is not incompatible with Monarchy; for it is no more impeachment to Monarchy, that the people should injoy then make lawes; that they should be sharers in the power of declaring and executing, then in the power of passing & framing lawes; but it is on the contrary an evident impeachment

to liberty, if an equality of these three Priviledges be not at least shared with the people.

3. As for the diametricall opposition in Religion and State betwixt us and our irreconcilable enemies of the Kings party. The Replie maintaines divers things: and of the Papists and Delinquents he sayes, *That we have nothing against them, but State Calumnies: That the same justice may governe both, if wee will submit to Law. He beseeches us to tell what Religion we would have: if that which the Martyrs sealed with their blood, our Adversaries practise it, and desire severe punishment upon all such as transgress it: he imputes to us a new Creed: he sayeth King is to look upon friends or enemies in a Law nation only, that Subjects must not give Lawes to Princes courtesies: That our enemies, if they be Traytors, are to be tried at the Kings Bench, the house of Commons having no right of Judicature.*

The major part of our enemies are certainly either Papists, or else such as are either over-awed or outwitted by Papists. Tis true, some part of our enemies knowes the truth of the Protestant Religion, and the desperate antipathy of Papistry; yet having in them the true power of no Religion, but serving Mammon only, for their worldly interests sake, (with which severity of Parliaments will not square) they adhere to Papists, little regarding what Religion stands, or what falls. Another part out of meere ignorance is carried away with the name King, and the Professions of the King, not at all looking into reason of State, nor being able to judge of the same: but the last sort of men are not so considerable, either for their number, or power, or malice; and therefore I shall not insist upon them.

The maine Engineers in this Civill Warre are Papists, the most poysonous, serpentine, Jesuited Papists of the world. All the Papists in *Europe* either pray for the prosperity of this designe, or have contributed some other influence and assistance to it. This warre was not the production of these two last yeares, nor was *England* alone the field wherein the Dragonsteeth were sowed. *Scotland* was first attempted, but the Protestant party there was too strong for the Papists, and such of the English as joyned with them. The conspiracies next broke out in *Ireland*, where the Popish party being too strong for the Protestants, the Tragedy has been befitting Papists, it has proved beyond all paralell bloody; and if shipping were not wanting, they might spare some aids for their fellow Conspirators here in *England*.

England is now in its agony, bleeding and sweating under the sad conflict of two parties, equally almost poized in force and courage.

The Papists themselves in *England* amount not to the twentieth arithmetically part of Protestants, and yet one papist in geometrical proportion may stand against twenty Protestants, considering the papists with together with their adherents, and considering also what they are that act over them, and who they are that act under them. What power the Romish Vice-god has in the Queen is known, & what power the Queen has in the King, and what power the King and Queen have in the prelati- cal Clergy, and the Clergy in them reciprocally, and what power the King, Queen and Clergy have on a great number of irreligious or luke- warm protestants (now made Delinquents and so further engaged) as also upon all papists, & how all these have interests divided & intertwined & how restlessly active they all are in pursuing their interests is not unknown.

Besides *Ireland* is a weakness, & *Scotland* is no strength to us: all popish countries *France*, & *Spain* &c. are likely to annoy us, and the protestants in *Denmark*, *Holland* &c. have not power to restrain their Princes from combining further against us. In this deplorable condition we have no friends to complain to, and yet this Replicant tells us, *we have no enemies to complain of*; our very condoling against papists and delinquents, he terms *State calumnies*, and *slanders that have lost their credit by time*, and are *confuted by experience*. O thou black mouth, more black then thy coat, hast thou no more remorse for all that protestant blood, which delinquents have enabled papists to shed in *Ireland*, and for all that protestant blood which armies of papists and delinquents are now ready to shed in *England*? if all this blood finde no pity in thee, yet is it an offence to thee, that it extorts teares and lamentations from us? O thou unbowelled sanguinary wretch, if God be the God of protestants, he will judge these cruelties of papists, and their abettors: and if he be the God of papists, we know our slanders and calumnies cannot deceive him; wee submit our selves and our cause to his revenging hand. But thou wilt say, *the Kings party in this warre are good Protestants, and we are Anabaptists, &c.* The tyranny and superstition of Bishops has driven some of our tender and stricter protestants into utter dislike of Ceremonies, and that pompous, or rather superstitious forme of Church discipline which has beene hitherto used in *England*. Some of us desire an alteration of somethings in our Lyrurgy, by advice of a learned and uncorrupt Synod: others perhaps scruple Church musick, and any set forme of divine service, to be imposed of necessity, liking better the single order of *Scotland*. What new Creed is there in all this, or what change of Religion were this, if there were any great numbers of men so opinionated? But it is well enough knowne to

our Adversaries, that there is not one man of both Houses of Parliament that is violent against all publick set formes of prayer, or that forme which is now in use, or that desires any alteration of Doctrine in Essentials, nay nor of Discipline, except in things very few and inconsiderable. And it is well knowne that the Parliament, as it would loosen the rigour of Law in some scruples for the ease of tender consciences, so it abhors utterly all licentious government in the Church, and all by-ways of confusion. In the City the King has instanced in *Pennington, Ven, Foulk, and Mannerling*, as notoriously guilty of Schisme, and doubtlesse they were named for want of worse: try these men now by the old Creed, or by the nine and thirty Articles; nay, examine them concerning the Common prayer Book, and it will soon appeare how farre they are strayed into Brownisme, or any other Schisme: it will appeare how they are wounded in schismatick, and all protestants in them, and the true Religion in us all. it may be they have not put pluralities, or the Parliamentary Votes of Bishops into their Creed; it may be they have reserved no implicite faith for Convocation acts, and Canons, which the Replicant may perhaps judge very irreligious; but they hope this never had any anathema pronounced against it in the old Church by any Councell before Antichrists dayes. Let not railing pulse for impleading and condemning, and we will all be tried in the same manner, and if any new Creed be found amongst us, differing in substance from the old, let our adversaries themselves give and execute sentence upon us. If Brownists could be as well distinguished and nominated in our Army, as papists are in the Kings, or were really as many and as far countenanced, we would distrust our cause; whereas we now beg no otherwise the blessing of God upon our Armies, then as we are enemies both to Popery and Brownism. Dares our Replicant make such a prayer? no, sometimes he owns Papists, and sometimes he seemingly disowns them: speaking of the Kings party, once he saies, *As for the established religion we will become sisters to you, that you will severely punish all persons whatsoever that transgress against it.* Papists certainly have transgressed against our religion; if the rebellion in Ireland be a transgression, or if the instant taking up of arms here against the parliament be a transgression; yet see at the same time, when they call us to punish the papists, they themselves arm & enable papists to punish, nay to destroy us, is this all the ingenuity we shall expect? well, to our law notion: it is argued in the next place, *that a Papist fighting for the King, though in a notion of Theology, he may be accounted an enemy quatenus a Papist, yet in understanding of Law, hee was accounted the Kings friend, as so his fighting: Priests squires Doctrine just, hee that fights for the King,*

or rather at the Kings command, let the cause be what it will, he is the Kings friend.

When *Saul* gave a furious command to fall upon the Priests of *Iehovah*; amongst all his servants, he had no entire loving friend but *Doeg*: so when his unnaturall rage incited him to take away the life of *Jonathan*, the whole Army that defended *Jonathan* were his foes, and if it had proceeded to parties (as it had, if *Saul* had had as many *Idumeans* in his service as King *Charles* now has) those onely which had been the execrable instruments of the Kings Tyranny, had been the Kings friends, and had fought for their King: so those six hundred men which adhered to *David*, out of a pious intent, to preserve his innocent soule from the bloody hands of *Saul*, and his three thousand impious murderers; and the *Keilites* also, if they had been faithfull to *David* (as they ought to have been) were guilty of Treason and drew their swords against their master. But I expect now that the Replicant insist upon the Justice of the Kings cause, as not taking armes to master the Parliament, but to defend themselves against the Parliament: this if it could be proved, would over-rule all, but it being in question, and as resolutely denied by one side, as affirmed by the other; the Replicant must evince by reason all that he expects to gaine from us. 'Tis not so probable that a Parliament should invade a King, as a King a Parliament: 'Tis not so probable, that a Parliament should be misled, and have ends to enrich it selfe by oppression as a King. 'Tis not so probable, that that Army which consists all of Protestants, should be so adverse to the reformed Religion, as that which admits and favours all Papists and Delinquents: 'Tis not so probable, that that Army which is raised and payed by Parliament, that is by the flower of all the English Nobility and Gentry, should fight for Arbitrary government, and against propriety, liberty and priviledge of Parliament; as that which hath nothing considerable, but rapine and pillage to maintaine it. If many evidences of facts, many pregnant proofs, and many lively circumstances of time and place, did not absolve the Parliament of trayterous conspiring against the Kings Crowne, Dignity, and person; and convince *Digby*, *Percy*, *Iermin*, and divers of the Kings and Queens party, of conspiring against the priviledges of Parliament, and the lives of many of our noblest Parliament men. If all other arguments did faile, the very invitation of Papists to the Kings Standard, & the rising of the Papists with such generall consent now, that all *Ireland* is almost lost to the papists, and some hopes were else to recover it, would sufficiently assure me, that religion and liberty stand in more danger of the Kings party, than of the parliament.

I could not with more cleare and cheerefull confidence die for the truth of the protestant Religion, then for the Iustice of the parliaments cause in this warre, *nos citur ex Comite, &c.* Let the papist plead for the Delinquent, and the Delinquent for the papist, those ends which have so closely cemented, and kindly incorporated both together, make a sufficient discovery to me, as well what the papist, as what the Delinquent is. And this age must prove monstrously unnaturall, in producing a wonder never heard of in all former ages, If Iustice doe now rest on the Kings side; For surely, no King ever till now, having a iust cause, was opposed therein by the maior and better part of his subjects; much lesse was it ever seene or heard of, that any King in a iust cause was deserted by the maiority of his Orthodox subjects, and supported by the unanimous aid of such, as hated his true protested Religion. God send the King to lay these things seriously and pensively to heart, for since none of his wise and worthy Ancestors ever yet had cause to wage war either with the Collective or Representative Body of the People: so none at all ever in any warre sided with a false Religion, or against the true, till this unhappy day; in the King *Charles* is the first, and I hope will be the last, and therefore this is worthy to make a sad impression upon his soule. But our Replicant will tell us, *That the Kings Iustice may yet govern and awe both parties by the same Law, whatsoever their antipathy be.* The King has Law, and power by the Law to protect the better partie, and to provide for the peace of both parties: But notwithstanding that Law and that power the poore British Protestants in *Ireland* have beene left unprotected, and lamentably exposed to a generall Assassination: And had they not beene betrayed by their vaine confidence in the Law, and in the Kings protection, they perhaps might have found other meanes to defend themselves; therefore it is no refuge or comfort to them now, to hear the name of Law proclaimed & reiterated, when as things hapned there, it has been the very shelve and rock whereon the Protestants have been miserably bulied and wricked; when pardon pray, if the same name of Iustice also sound but harshly at this time in our eares: when papists which have destroyed our religion in *Ireland*, are rayled to preserve it in *England*; and protestants which were sending succours and supplies into *Ireland*, are in the instant invaded here in *England* for the better suppression of Popery both here and in *Ireland*; Tis a strange kinde of assurance or ioy to us, to see the names of Religion, Liberty, and parliamentary priviledge, stamped upon our coyne, or interwoven in our Standard, when at the same time, we see the same Coyne impressed for the entertainment of a Popish Army:

and the same stand marching against the representative body of our Nation, and the supreme Court of Justice in our State. Nay, and the strange time that is taken for the righting of Religion, Law and Liberty amongst us, makes our assurance, and joy the lesse triumphant, for we plainly see, that as the season now is, no one Protestant falls here by the Kings sword; but by the same stroke three Protestants at least are cut off in *Ireland*. And lastly, the manner of righting Religion, Law and Liberty, is most strange of all, for open warre is not now sufficiently destructive, though it be spread all over the face of the Kingdom; subterranean plots are brooded further in the dark, and by privie intelligence, the whole City of *London* is to be engaged in a tragicall conspiracy, to murder it selfe in one night: What the benefit therefore is of Law and Power, and Justice for the disabling of Papist and Delinquents, and for the safeguarding of loyall Protestants we all know: But when papists and delinquents finde countenance, and the true religion is abandoned, and left obnoxious to mischief by the perversion of Law, Power and Justice; the names alone will not availe us, but our Replicant further saith, *Subjects must not give Lawes to Princes courtesies*. In matters of a private nature Princes are absolute, but not so in publike affaires, where the publike safety or liberty is touched. In their own pallaces Princes may dispose of Offices, but in the state if they make Patents prejudiciall to their revenues, to their prerogatives, or to the peoples interest; the Iudges shall pronounce them deceived in their grants, and make the deeds void and null in Law: Princes cannot alien any parcells of their Crownes, *Hull* may not be transferred to the King of *Denmark*, nor *Portsmouth* to *France*, nor *Falmouth* to *Spaine*, for Kings have no sole propriety in such things, and the same reason is in the superintending Offices of Royalty it selfe; they are not transferible at pleasure: Some Princes (to use the words of *Tacitus*) are so infirme and credulous, that they remaine *jussis alienis obnoxii*, and *non modo Imperii sed libertatis etiam indigent*; they are so enslaved sometimes to their basest flatterers, that their very Diadems are as it were aliend and made prostitute to seducers, and these their flatterers and seducers (in the expressions of the same *Tacitus*) *Minore metu & minore praemiis percutiunt*.

The unhappy Protestants in *Ireland* were of late undone by the vaste power which was put into the hands of the Earle of *Strafford*, and all the Ecclesiasticall, if not Civill disturbances and distractions which have of late infested these three Kingdoms, were in great part caused by excessive of power over the Church, delegated to the Archbishop of *Canterbury*:

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Without doubt when the foundation of *Popery* was first to be laid, it did not prosper and advance so much in sixscore yeeres under the first Popes, as it did in fix yeeres here under *Canterbury*: And *Nero* himselfe in his first three yeeres did not attaine to so much insolence and tyranny as *Strafford* did in one yeare.

The Kings freedom therefore in favours will never justifie the preferring of such men, to an unquestionable command, nor the subjecting the lives, liberties, and soules of so many millions of Religious Protestants to their corrupted disaffected wills: Neverthelesse, for ought I can see we have since but changed one *Strafford* for another, and one *Canterbury* for another: Only to stop our complaints: This Replicant tell us, *That the courties of Princes are not to be questioned by subjects.* The Queen has now attained to a great heighth of power as formidable as she is to us, in regard of her sex, in regard of her Nation, in regard of her disposition, in regard of her family, in regard of her Religion, and lastly, in regard of her ingagments in these present troubles; some think shee has an absolute unlimitable power over the Kings sword and Scepter; which if it bee so, no end of our feares and calamities can be, no propositions can profit us, no Accommodation can secure us. If the King himselfe were a Papist, he would yet look upon us as his naturall subjects, but when his regall power is secondarily in the hands of a Papist, to that Papist we appeare but as meere hereticks without any other relation of subjects: By secondary power also, a stroak is given with more secrecie and security; so that there is the lesse feare in the party striking to break and retard its violence: It issues like a bullet, whose line is not direct, but with some elevation in the ayre, or with some windings in the barrell of the gun, whereby it doth more execution at a further distance. Therefore our Kings many and dreadfull Oaths and Vowes of sincerity in the Protestant Religion are not satisfying, if in the mean time any of his Kingly prerogative bee shared with such as are not sincere in the Protestant Religion; it were farre safer for us that hee would sweare for his party, then for himselfe.

But our Replicant will never have done with the Law, hee still tells us, *That every man is to bee tryde by his Peeres the Lords in the Lords House, and the Commons at the Kings Bench, and though the House of Commons have no right of Iudicature, yet there is another tryall for Treasons, and our more point in difference at this time is concerning Treason.*

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The Parliament is nothing else but the whole Nation of *England* by its owne free choice, and by vertue of representation united in a more narrow roome, and better regulated and qualified for consultation then the collective body without this art and order could be. The Lords and Commons make but one entire Court, and this Court is virtually the whole Nation: and we may truly say of it, that by its consent Royalty it selfe was first founded, and for its ends Royalty it selfe was so qualified and tempered, as it is; and from its supream reason, the nature of that qualification and temperature ought only to be still learned, and the determination thereof sought. For who can better expound what Kings and lawes are, and for what end they were both created, then that unquestionable power, which for its owne advantage meely gave creation to them both? If Kings and nationall lawes had any humane beginning, if they be *dispositi, & non creati*, as the scripture sayes they are; they had not their being from themselves: and from nations collectively taken they could not have their being; for nations so are not congregable, nor consultable, nor redeemable from confusion (pardon the hardnesse of words) and therefore it must follow, that both Kings and laws were first formed and created by such bodyes of men, as our Parliaments now are; that is, such Councells as had in them the force of whole Nations by consent and deputation, and the Maiesty of whole Nations by right and representation.

The enemies of Parliaments seeing this not to be gain-said, and seeing that it must needs follow, that that cause which first gave the being, and prescribed the end of that being, must needs have most right and skill to limit, and direct the manner of that being: they seek to divide the coactive from the representative body of the people: they seek to divide between the two houses of Parliament: and these seek to divide between the head and the body of the Parliament. They persuade the multitude, that they have entrusted the Parliament only with their purses to give away subsidies, and replenish the Kings coffers; but not to settle their rights and franchises, and to make knowne the bounds of Privilege, and restrain the unnaturall encroachments or eruptions of the same. If the community have beene aggrieved, to complaine, or almost accuse, is a sufficient priviledge of the House of Commons, and this, but to avoid further repining shall not be granted them. 'Tis pity that our Doctors doe not study the Law further; for with a little more industry, they might perhaps finde out, that every private man as well as the house of Commons, or the whole Community out of Parliament, as well as our Knights, and Burgeses in it, may
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give the King money, and if occasion be, preferre an accusation against such a tyrannicall Lord or favourite; well, if such Rabbies, and expounders can satisfie any of the unworthy vulgar, and some Gentlemen, and Lords who have spirits below the Yeomanry of England (for such I have seene too many since 3. Novemb. 1640, they shall be no further disabus'd by me. In the next place, *They attempt to work a division between the Houses, the Lords shall have a power of Judicature over their Members so they will excludethe Commons from any part therein; and upon condition that they will so farre disclaime them, as to leave them obnoxious for tryalls at the Kings bench;* This sitting of the Lords and Commons in severall Houses, does not prove them severall Courts, nor does the observance of particular Priviledges in either House, and not laying all things common between both, prove any independance of either: doubtlesse they are like the twines of *Hippocrates*, they both must live and die together. In former ages judgement was so given upon the greatest Delinquents, at that the Commons were parties in the judgement: And sure, whilst they were Judges over Lords, themselves were not subjected to inferiour Courts: the Lords then knew they could not indure any indignity to fall upon the Commons being but distinct parts of the same Court, but it would reflect upon themselves; and the Commons knew that the honour of the Lords was an addition to themselves, whilst the *Curiatii* stand close together, their three adverse Combatants are too weake for them; but when they are divided by unwarinesse in the encounter, they prove all three too weake for one of their enemies. I will not make any comparisons, or say whither the Lords or Commons deserted by the other suffer more; I will only say, that nothing but fatall want of policy, can divide or diminish their mutuall love and correspondence.

In the last place, *division also is raised betwixt the King and Parliament;* there is a generation of men which seeke not the good of King and Parliament; nor could prosper if the King and Parliament were united as they ought to be. These men because their suggestions cannot prevaile to alienate the Parliament from the King, apply all their indavours to alienate the King from the Parliament: their perpetuall suggestion are, *That the greatnesse of Kings is eclipsed by Parliaments, That there is in Lawes themselves a kind of enmity, and something that is inconsistent with royalty, That Kings are bound to seek nothing but themselves, That Kings can seeke nothing in themselves, so nobly as the satisfying of their wills, e-*

specially when their wills are fixt upon things difficult and forbidden. Nevertheless, there is nothing but falsity in all these suggestions. For Princes are the Creatures, and naturall productions of Parliaments, and so are their Prerogatives as has been set forth, and every rationall and naturall thing loveth its own off-spring, and that love is rather *ascending* then *descending*, it is liker the sap of the root, then of the branch, viz. *The people are more inclinable to love Princes, then Princes to love the People*; There is likewise a neare consanguinity, and reflexive benevolence of aspects between Lawes and Princes, they are both of the same descent, and tend to the same end, and both are inviolable. whilst they are assistant each to other; the enemy of both has no hope to prevaile, *Si attribuat Rex legi, quod lex attribuit ei*. Tis retrograde also to nature, that Princes whom God has set to feed his people, and not without the creation of the people, should think themselves more valuable then that people; or that they should confine their thoughts to themselves as Gods, despising the universality, when God has called particular subjects *their brethren*, and forbidden them to lift up their hearts above any of them.

Lastly, that Princes which have as other men, sinfull affections, and are subject more then other men to sinfull temptations, and are accountable to God therefore, in a higher degree then other men, should think it inglorious to deny their own irregular wills, and to submit to Lawes, Parliaments, and the Publike prayers and advice of their subjects, 'tis a thing scarce credible. The most expert Navigator prefers the guidance of his Needle before his own conceit; the most tried Engineer wholly relies upon the certainty of his rule. All Artists how rare soever apply themselves to their Instruments, absolutely renouncing their skill and experience in comparison of Mechanick directions. Only Princes chuse rather to erre with their own fancies and fancy feeding flatterers, then to go right with publick advice, and no mischiefe, which can happen to themselves, and millions of others by their error, seems so unkingly to be suffered, as a retraction from error. But our Replicant has more particular objections against Parliaments, *As first, That they have no cognizance of matters of State: secondly, That in matters of grace and pardon they have no power or right: the King in those, has an Arbitrary sole authority.*

Lawes ayme at *Justice*, Reason of state aimes at *safety*; Law secures one subject from another, Law protects subjects from insolence of Princes, and Princes from sedition of Subjects, so far as certaine rules may be gi-

ven and written; but reason of State goes beyond all particular formes and facts, and looks rather to the being, then well-being of a State, and seeks to prevent mischief forraign as well as Domestick, by emergent Counsels, and unwritten resolutions. Reason of State is something more sublime and imperiall then Law: it may be rightly said, that the Statesman begins where the Lawyer ceaseth: for when warre has silenced Law, as it often does; Policy is to bee observed as the only true Law, a kind of a dictatorial power is to be allowed to her; whatsoever has any right to defend it selfe in time of danger is to resort to policy in stead of Law, and it is the same thing in the Replicant, *To deny to Parliaments recourse to reason of State in these miserable times of warre and danger, as to deny them self-defence.*

Many men, especially Lawyers, would faine have Law alone take place in all times, but for my part I think it equally destructive to renounce reason of State, and adhere to Law in times of great extremity, as to renounce Law, & adhere to Policy in times of tranquillity. Nothing has done us more harme of late, then this opinion of adhering to Law only for our preservation: & the King and his party though they are too wise themselves to observe Law at all, yet have wrought much upon the simpler sort of our side by objecting against us neglect of Law. Certainly as our dangers now are, it would bee good for us to adde more power to the Earle of *Essex* (if he be thought the worthiest man of Trust amongst us, as he has deserved no lesse estimation) for till I see him lockt upon, and served as a temporary Dictator, and the bounds of his Commission to bee only this; *ne quid detrimenti capiat Respublica cavere*: I shall never think the Parliaments safety sufficiently provided for.

To frame any Arguments, or reasons, or to offer proofes, that the Representative body of the Kingdome is a Counsell of State, rather then a Court of Justice, would shew me as foolish as the Replicant: tis impossible any man should doubt of it, that doest think the being is to bee preferred before the well being; or that whole Nations have any interests either in their owne being or well being. Let our Adversaries triumph in their owne conceits, and when in the same case there is both matter of Law and State (as in the case of *Hall*, when the King had an interest rather in State then Law) let them upbraid us for declining of Law. I shall like that best which they dislike most in us: I wish we had not observed Law too farre, for they would never so farre recom.

mend it to us, did they not know it might be sometimes unseasonable.

As for acts of grace and pardon. I shall not much quarrel thereabout, the Parliament can best advise the King how far it is fit to passe a Law of oblivion in these generall times of confusion: And the Answerer of the *London* Petition affirmed nothing, but that their advise therein was likely to be most wholsome, which can hardly be contradicted.

And the Law is cleare enough that though the execution of Law be farre intrusted to the King, and there is a dispensing power in Him, so farre as he is supposed to be damnified or to be intersted in the penalty; yet where crimes have been committed against the whole State, the King ought not, and where particular men have been injured, the King cannot suffocate, frustrate, or deny Justice. 'Tis against his Oath, 'tis against publike Liberty to deny satisfaction by stopping execution.

4. *But London is the most considerable part of the Kingdome and the Petitioners the best part of London; and the most to bee valued in other parts, are inclined to the same request for peace, therefore the Parliament ought to yeeld.*

When our Adversaries please, they can alledge numbers for their advantage, as if the Major part of the people were cordially on the Kings side: when they please they can give you reasons why the major part of the people are enchanted, and therefore cannot be on the Kings side; yet we all know the major part cannot be both for and against the King at the same time in the same case. Besides divide *England* into 3. parts, and we doe not allow *London* to be the major of those three, and divide *London* into 3. parts, and the Petitioners cannot make it appear, that they are full one third part; this must be attributed to our Replicants boldnesse meerly. That which is manifest, is, that most of the faulty, and decayed Nobility, and Gentry, are of the Kings party, and so are the Lees of the people; but almost all of the Yeomenry (which is the most considerable ranke of any Nation) and a very choyse part both of Nobility and Gentry at this time side against the King and the Papists: And it is impossible for any rationall man to imagine, that the King has not infinite advantages against the Parliament, if his cause be generally apprehended, as the more just: But sense teaches us the contrary, that no King in the unjustest cause that ever was, had a weaker party then this King, considering what courtes he has taken. The King has an Army, and such an Army as is able to force and overawe
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all places where they lye, with swords drawne over the Pefants : but cursed be that man for my part, that next after God, would not referre the arbitration of this difference to the publike vote of the people. And yet we know that there is a great deal of servility in the people, and that for the most part, they looke no further then to present grievances; like *Esau* in his Pottage bargain, chusing rather to dy for ever of a Lethargy then to sweat for a time under a Feaver.

5. All Controversies are determined either by the Dye of Force, and chance of War (for so Nations have ever censur'd that kind of tryall) or else they are concluded by Lawes justly interpreted, or else there is a middle way (which we call Accommodation) and that is commonly when to avoid the mischiefe of the Sword, and the uncertaine intricacie of Judgement, both parties by mutuall agreement condescend equally to depart from the rigor of their demands on either side, and so comply, accommodate, and meet together upon termes as equall as may be. Whersoever then the word *Accommodation* is pressed, (as it is now with us in the *London* Petition, for the word Submission is not at all used) 'tis most absurd and contradictory to exclude a yeelding and compliance of both sides. See then the manifest injustice of our Repllicant, who when the matter of *Accommodation* onely is in Treaty, yet *urges us to a meere submission*, and taking it for granted that he is Judge, and that he has determined the matter for the King; *therfore the King ought not to condescend, or comply at all, or leave any thing to the Parliaments trust, but must wholly be trusted in every point.*

6. The King requires to have preserved to him for the future that compasse of Royall power which his Progenitors have been invested with, and without which he cannot give protection to his Subjects.

The Parliament desires to have preserved to the Subject, peace, safetie, and all those priviledges which their Ancestors have enjoyed, without which they cannot be a Nation, much lesse a free Nation. Now the Militia and Posse of the Kingdome must be so placed, and concredited, and that the King may be as equally assured of it, as the Parliament, or else without all Accommodation the King must be left to the Fidelity and duty of Parliament, or else the Parliament must be wholly left to the Kings discretion, or rather to the Kings party. In this case what shall be done, the Parliament pleads that the King has resigned

himselfe too far into the hands of Papists and Malignants, from whom nothing can be expected but perfidie and cruelty; The King objects that the Parliament is besotted with Anabaptists, Brownists, Familists, and Impostors, from whom nothing can be expected but disloyalty and confusion. If the King here will grant any security against Papists and Malignants, the question is what security he will give; and if hee will give none, the question is how he can be said to seek an Accommodation; so on the contrary, if the Parliament will undertake to secure the King, as that is granted, then what must that securance be. I will now take it for granted, that the King ought to abjure for the future the giving of countenance to Papists, or being counseled or led by them in State matters; as also to disband his Forces, and that the Parliament will doe the like, and abjure all dangerous Schismatics and Hereticks. But for a further tye to strengthen this abjuration, and for a securance against Malignants, who are not yet so perfectly distinguished on either side, what shall be the reciprocall caution or ingagement? Shall the King have all Forts, Ships, Armes, and Offices in his dispose? Shall the King assigne to what Judges he pleases, the division of our quarrels? or shall he trust his Parliament in the choise and Approbation of persons intrusted? I will not dispute this, I will onely say, that the nature of an Accommodation requires some condescending on both sides, and it is manifest injustice in the Replicant to prejudge the same, as unbecoming the King more then the Parliament, and in all probability the Parliament is likely to condescend upon more disadvantageous termes then the King; and is lesse lyable to be misled, and lesse apt to break a trust, then any one man.

7. To show that the Parliament is disaffected to an Accommodation, and the King not & that therefore a Petition to the Parliament is more proper & seasonable then to the King. The Replicant bitterly reviles the Parliament as having punished some for seeking peace, and as having rejected the Kings gracious offers of peace with termes of incivility below the respect due to a King. What more damnable crimes can any man load the Parliament with, then with rebelling against the King first, & after rejecting officers of peace with foule and scandalous language? Yet this the Replicant freely grants to himselfe, and as if hee were placed in some tribunall above the Parliament, where all allegations and proofes were utterly superfluous, he pronounces his sentence very imperiously. For ought I know I am as venerable and unquestionable a judge in this case as hee is, yet I dare

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condemn nothing, but rash and presumptuous condemning of authority without proofes; and for that I have Scripture it selfe for my proote. As for the Kings comming to *Brainford* in a mist, and during a *Treaty*, and there surprising men unprepared, and retiring againe upon the drawing up of our forces, that these are instances of seeking peace, and shewing favour to the city is not so cleare to my understanding as to the *Replicants*.

8. But sayes the *Replicant*, you grant that the people may perhaps find out a better way of *Accommodation* then you have done, and you allow them to petition when you faile of your duty: And this must needs overthrow the strongest and most popular argument of your innocence, and authority.

The Parliament did never assume to have an absolute freedom from all failes or Errors, nor does detract from other mens knowledge, it vindicates nothing more then to bee lesse obnoxious to deceit and perverseness then other Courts, and that the rather because it disdaines not any advise or reason from any parties whatsoever.

9. The Answerer demanded from the Petitioners a modell of an *Accommodation* to bee framed by them, for the better help and instruction of the Parliament. The *Replicant* satisfies that Demand. Hee makes two propositions thus; 1. That the Parliament shall as readily consent to the Kings rights as the King consents to theirs. 2. That the *Reigne of Queen Elizabeth*: may be the measure to determine those rights. In this the *Replicant* is very reasonable; for we freely submit to both his propositions: but he is not so Politick as he thinks; for a submission to these generall propositions, will not determine any one of our Particular debates. Let us be safe, as wee were in *Queen Elizabeths* dayes, and let us be secured of our safety by the same meanes, as *Queen Elizabeth* secured us; That is, by shewing no countenance to Papists (much lesse admitting them as Counsellors, least of all as Governors in her highest Councells) let wise men generally loved and revered sit at the Councell Table, and let the Publick advise of Parliament sway above all private; let our Lawes be in the Custody of learned, and uncorrupt Judges, and let our *Militia* be under the Command of such renowned Patriots, as shee preferred in her dayes; and our *Accommodation* is more ample, and beneficiall, then any we have yet desired. But our *Replicant* will suggest, Be you such Subjects as *Queen Elizabeth* ruled, and King Charles

Charles will treat you, as Queen Elizabeth did her Subjects: doe you right first to the King, and the King will not faile to doe right to you. Here is now the maine Question indeed, which rightly solved, would solve all, whether these deplorable miseries, which have of late vexed and grieved our three Nations, have rather hapned from the Change of the People, or from the Change of the Prince.

And most certaine it is future Ages will conceive no great doubt, or difficulty to be in this Question: but now it is mortall to dispute it: it is scarce lawfull to suppose any thing herein, Though *supponere* be not *ponere* but by way of supposition, I will only plead thus: if the three Nations have by I know not what fatall posture, and Congress of stars, or superior Causes, declined from their allegiance, and degenerated into unnaturall obstinacy, and turned recreant, and contrary to the sweet *Genius*, which was ever in their Ancestors, they are bound to submit to the King & to put in him as full and absolute a Trust, as our Parents did in *Queen Elizabeth*: but on the contrary, if miscarriages in government, and the pernicious Counsells whereby our Princes have been guided, have overwhelmed us in these inundations of blood, and mischiefs; the Alteration, and Reformation, ought to begin first in the King, and He cannot expect that we should trust him so farre as we did *Queen Elizabeth* untill we are assured as fully of his protection as we were of *Queen Elizabeths*; but suppose there have been faults on both sides, can nothing but the sword rectifie our faults? I never yet heard that any Prince was forced to a warre with any considerable part of his own Subjects, but that he had an unjust cause, or might have determined the strife without blood by some Politick Compliance if he pleased. It is not so common or probable in nature, for Nations causlessly to rebell, as for Princes wickedly to oppress: and when armes are taken up on both sides, it is not so safe for Subjects to yeeld, as for Kings; nor can Subjects so easily reduce Kings to a peaceable agreement, and cessation of Armes, as Kings may Subjects for the sparing of blood. Kings can make no composition almost dishonourable, or disadvantageous; but Subjects being false into the indignation of revengfull Princes are necessitated commonly to this choyce, either to come forth with halts about their necks, or to fight upon great disadvantages. as *Rebellious* as the Subjects of *Rehoboam* were, a kind, nay, a Civill Answer might have retayned them in their allegiance, and

and yet if their terms had been full of insolence, and their Capitulations more unreasonable, yet *Salomon's* Councillors would have perswaded *Rehoboam* to yeild to necessity, and to master that multitude by some fineness of wit, which he could not tame for the present by violence; And certainly he shewed not himself the Son of *Salomon*, that would not purchase an hereditary Empire over a gallant Nation by being a Servant for one day, that would quit his own policy, because the multitude had quitted their civillie; that thought that Compliance which should gain a scepter more dishonourable, than that Contestation which should absolutely forfeit one. How easy had it been for the great, the wise, the terrible *Philip of Spaine*, to have prevented the totall defection of so many goodly Provinces in the *Netherlands*: and if it could not have been done without something which is ordinarily accounted below, a King would not that have been more honourably done by him, then the casting away of so brave a Dominion, and the casting after that so much blood & treasure? That King of *France* was far wiser, and sped better, which satisfied himselfe in his struggling through many difficulties with this Maxime, That a Prince can loose no honour by any Treaty, which addes to his Dominion. Infinite instances might here bee alleadged, but they are needlesse. God send our King truly to represent these things to himselfe, and rather to trust plain, then pleasing advice. God open his eyes, that he may see how honorably, and easily he might have prevented these calamities, and may yet stanch our bleeding wounds, and how much more difficult it is and unsafe for the Parliament to compose things unlesse he or rather his Party be equally disposed to hearken to peace. *Hen. the 4.* was as wise, as valiant, and as just a Prince as ever was Crowned in *England*, and no Prince ever had by experience a more perfect understanding of the English Generals: yet he in his death bed (where dissimulation uses to be laid aside) in his last advice to his own son and heire (whom it was not likely he would willingly deceive) deciphered the English Nation to be generally observant of their Princes, and whilst they were well treated, and preserved in Peace and plenty, most incomparable for their perfect inviolable loyalty, but of all nations the most unquiet under such a harsh rule, which should render them servile, poore and miserable.

This he had abundantly proved, and found true by the wofull deposition of his unpolitick Kinsman and predecessor *Rich. the 2.*

and his own prosperous, and glorious Raigne, and many strange
traverſes of Fortune, which through ut his whole Raigne. He
was forced to encounter withall. His ſcope therefore was to re-
commend to his ſons charge this Nation both as dutiful, and as
generous, of whoſe loyalty he needs not to doubt, ſo long
as his Juſtice was not to be doubted. O that this moſt Ex-
cellent Prince could bee againe ſummoned from his peacefull
Monument to repeate the ſame advertiſements in our Sovereignes
cares, and to juſtice out of his preſence theſe bloud thirſty Papists
and Malignants, which uſe all poſſible art to ſtaine the people's loy-
alty, and to candy over all his actions, intending thereby not to
reconcile the people by procuring grace from the King, but to con-
found both King and people, by ſoftering enmity between both?
I will only adde this by ſuch inſtigations, as our Replicant and his
fellow Courtiers uſe, the King cannot be happy, but by the uncer-
tainty of war, that is by making his ſubjects miſerable: but
ſuch Traytors as I am, if our adviſe bee entertained, propoſe
to the King a more certaine way to happineſſe by Peace
that is by making his ſubjects yet more happy; but our Replicant
ſaith, *the King is willing to condeſcend to any thing, but you will admit of
no reconciliation, except the King will remove thoſe ſervants, whom he
had found moſt honeſt and faſtfull in his afflictions, and prefer you un-
deſerving in their place.* Here is the grand knot indeed, we oppoſe
ſuch as have been the Counſellors or inſtruments of ſuch and ſuch
deſignes: *the King ſaith, they are his friends, and he cannot abandon
his friends:* tis conteſt, the King ought not to abandon his friends,
but the King may erre in the knowledge of friends: and as he ought
to protect his friends, in whom he cannot err; ſo he is not bound
to protect ſuch as he meerly thinks his friends, and in whom if he
will beleieve the voice of the people, he is very much deceived. We
have as much intereſt in the Kings friends and Counſellors as we
have in our Laws, Liberties, lives, any thing, for we know we can
enjoy nothing if the King ſhall owne thoſe for his friends, whom
we know to be our enemies, and account of theſe as good Coun-
ſels, which we know to be treaſons againſt the State, that Prince
that will be arbitrary and rely upon his owne meer opinion, and
diſcretion in the imploymēt of Counſellors and Miniſters of State,
having no regard to publique approbation therein, is as injurious
altogether as he that will admit of no other Law, judge, nor rule
in

in the propriety and liberty of his subjects, but his owne brest only.

It will be replyed, not fancy, but sense teaches this, that he that obeyes the Kings commands, and fights under the Kings Standart is more a friend than he that disobeyes, and fight against the King: this is demonstration, no error can be in it.

I answer no, 'tis most false, Scripture and reason manifest it to be most false.

Doeg did obey *Saul*, when all his other servants denyed obedience, yet even in that obedience he made himselfe culpable, and his master abominable, whereas the other servants of *Saul* were dutifull in withholding an unlawfull duty.

So those 3000 Souldiers which marched out after *Saul* to take away the life of just and uncondemned *David*, they were instruments in a base disservice to *Saul*, they are not to be justified for this service; whereas those 600 valiant men which accompanied *David* in his dangers and afflictions and were ready with their sword drawn to guard that innocence, which *Saul* himself should have guarded are not to be accounted false to *Saul* but true to *David*.

And the meere presence of *Saul* on the one side, did not make the cause unjust on the other side, nor if himself had fallen by rushing oftentimes, upon defensive weapons, could that horrid guilt of his death, have been imputed to any but to himself. Cursed therefore, yea thrice cursed be these miscreants, which ingage the King in this war against the Parliam not without hazard of his sacred Person, if they be private persons and have not sufficiency to decide this great controversie betwixt the King and Parliament.

For my part I dare not pronounce sentence, neither for nor against the Parliament, as the Replicant without all scruples doth in all places; but I may safely say, that if the King does, though in person, unjustly wage war against the Parliament; the E of *Essex* and his Army may far more lawfully fight in defence of that supreme Court, than *David* and his followers did for the protection of one innocent private man.

And taking the controversie as undecided, 'tis not appare who fight for or against the King, and the King may himself as lawfully claime to be sole supreme judge over all single and universall persons, and over all Laws and Courts, and in all cases whatsoever, as to claime any man a Traitor for serving the Parliament in this war; and this if he claimes, what Priviledge remaines to Parliament, what

limits remaine to the Prince : what liberty remaines to the Subjects?

'Tis not only then trayterous, but ridiculous in the Replicant to assume that supremacy to himself, which is denyed to the King by condemning the Parliament and justifying the Kings party in all passages of this War, we when we except against the Kings party, asperse not at all the Kings person, and the Law it self makes ever a distinction betwixt the King and his agents: though our Replicant will not allow any such severance. but betwixt the Parliam. and its instruments no such severance is except for the worse, for there *pejor est author quam actor*, but sayes the Replicant. *'Tis the unhappinesse of the King that he hath a party, 'tis the fault of the Parliament, he desires and ought to have the whole.* See here 'tis the Parliaments fault that *Percy, Digby, Winter, Mountague, Crofts, Killgrew*, and many other of the Queens devoted Creatures are preferred in the Kings favour before the Parliament. And 'tis the Parliaments fault, that *Rivers, King*, and the Titular Count of the *Valaine* with some other Irish Papists latly come over have the honour of the Court, command of the Camp, and spoyle of the Kingdom to reward them, whilst *Manchester, Hambden, Hellis, Kim, Strod, Haselrig*, are designed for the block, and that upon such charges, as shall intangle almost all the most eminent Gentry and Nobility, as well as them, *That this is the Kings unhappinesse is agreed*, but that this is the Parliaments fault is not proved by the Replicant, and we are not bound alwayes to abate him proofes in matters of this consequence. Doubtlesse we are likely to expect great performances from Parliaments hereafter if it shall be guilt in them that they are rejected, and if they shall be rejected only because other more favoring Courtiers pretend better affection to the Kings private advantage.

The actions of Popish and Malignant Courtyers, cannot represent them more friendly to the K. than the Parliaments. No honour or prosperity has followed hitherto therupon. all their difference is that their single professions of Love are more credited, than such as are credited by the Votes of the Generality, and attestations of Parliament.

Howsoever though many men do think, private advise and testimony, to be more valuable, and fit for Princes to hearken too, then publick, I never till now heard, that it was a fault or blame in Parliaments to be lesse valued or accepted then private persons.

To

To what purpose is it said? *that the King ought to have the whole*: it is our complaint that the King will not accept of the whole: and it is the Replicants complaint, that the King is not suffered to enjoy the whole. This shall reconcile all: let the whole be received as the whole; and every part as it is Major, or Minor be entertained in grace and equipage proportionably, and this difference is composed.

10 But sayes the Replicant, *the Kings party is the more just, and therefore to be preferred, and this is to be judged of by rule; as thus, the Parliament intrenches upon our Liberty by imprisoning without cause, according to pleasure and claimes to be unquestionable therein: The Parliament intrenches upon Religion by committing our best Professors and planting Sectaries in their stead, the Parliament proceeds according to reason of State, not Law: and this places an arbitrary power in them, and makes ordinances equall to acts of Parliament.*

Heare in a breif summe all that ever has been spoken, or can be spoken against the Parliament; and all this is grounded upon an ungranted proposition, that the Parliament has no right to defend it self: For if it be lawfull for both Houses of Parliament to defend themselves, it must of necessity follow, that they may and must imprison, levye moneyes, suppress seditious preachers, and make use of an arbitrary power according to reason of State, and not confine themselves to meere expedients of Law. Enough has been said of this, 'tis impossible that any wise man should be opposite herein, and the Kings party have more recourse to reason of State, and arbitrary power by far than we have.

But if it be said, *that the Houses abuse arbitrary power in imprisoning, levying moneyes &c. causlessly*; this is a false calumny, and not to be granted without particular and pregnant proofes, of which the Replicant produces none at all, were it not for this great noise and boast of Arbitrary power, our Academians would want matter to stuffe their innumerable pamphlets withall: and the silly sort of Malignants would want fuel to feed their enmity.

And yet we know, Arbitrary power is only dangerous in one man or in a few men, and cannot be so in Parliaments at any time; much lesse in times of publick distresse: for then it is not only harmless but necessary.

The House of Commons without the other States hath had an arbitrary power at all times, to dispose of the treasure of the Kingdome, and where they give away one subsidy, they may give 20,

and where they give 50000^l at one subsidy they may give fifty times so much, and all this whether war or peace be.

Yet when did either King or Subject complaine of this arbitrary power? Nay if any parts of the Kingdom have repined at the abuse of this arbitrary power, and refused to pay subsidys assessed by the house of Commons, what Kings would suffer it? when was it not held a good ground of War? to both Houses have an arbitrary power to abridge the freedom of the Subject, and to enlarge the Kings prerogative, beyond a measure; they may repeale our great Charter, the Charter of Forreists, and the petition of right if they please; they may if they please subject the whole Kingdom for ever to the same arbitrary rule as *France* groines under, nay, & they have often been with force and all manner of sollicitations almost violented into it: and yet notwithstanding all this, we are neither terrified nor indangered at all by this arbitrary power in both houses.

To have then an arbitrary power placed in the Peers and Comm. is naturall and expedient at all times, but the very use of this arbitrary power, according to reason of State, and warlick policy in times of generall dangers and distresse is absolutely necessary and inevitable: but 'tis a great offence, *that both Houses should make ordinances generally binding.*

They, which would take from us all meanes of defence; if they could dispute us out of the power of making temporary Ordinances had their wils upon us, for defence without some obliging power to preserve order, and to regulate the method of defence, would be vaine and absurd; but this is but one branch of arbitrary power and reason of State, and to wast time in proving it necessary in times of extremity, if defence be granted lawfull, were childish and ridiculous.

I have now done with the Replicant, so far as he hath spoken to the matter, I shall now come to his emergent, strange, calumnious speeches, against the persons of such and such men, but this were *Caninos rodere dentes*. I forbear it, only rehearsing some raylings, which need no answer but themselves.

The two houses are generally railed at, *as guilty of Rebellion against the King*. All adherents to Parliament are railed at, *as Anabaptists, Separatists, &c.* The Lord Major is railed at, for preventing bloodshed in the City, when the Petitioners under the pretence of seeking for Peace, had many of them plotted dissention, and this his Office is stiled *the stiffling of peace in the womb.*

The

The City Preachers are railed at, for satisfying our Consciences in the justifiableness of a defensive war, for this they are charged to fight against the King in the feare of God, and to turn the spirituall Militia into weapons of the flesh. The framer of the Answer is rayled at for giving the Petitioners just satisfaction in peaceable language. *Though his words be confessed to be softer than oyle, yet 'ts said, that the poyson of Aspes is under his lips; he is called a Cataline, the firebrand of his Countrey, whose sophistry and eloquence was fit to disturbe a State, but unable to compose or settle it.*

The judgment of all these things is now submitted to the world, what the intent of the Petition was, in some master-plotters and contrivers of it, will appeare by the arguments of this fell Repl-icant. Whereby it is now seconded. That the name of an Accomodation was pretended to force the two Houses under colour thereof, to cast themselves upon a meer submission, or to be made odious, and lookt upon as foes to peace, which was a *Scilla* on one side, and *Charybdis* (on the other) is here manifested. Whether the Answer to the Petition favour of so much malice and enmity to peace, as this Re-plication does, let indifferent men censure,

Lastly, whether the soule of that man which thirsts for a firme Peace, may not dislike these practises of pretending to it; and the soule of that man which hates peace, may not make advantage of the name of peace, let all wise men proved and examine.

FINIS.